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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
After serving 30 years in prison for crimes that were committed when he was 23 years
old, Petitioner

brings this action pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil

Practice Law and Rules to vacate the February 2021 decision of the New York State Board of
Parole (the "Board") denying him release on parole. Given M r . - age, personal growth,
and ties to the community, he is no longer a threat to commit any violent or nonviolent crime.
Mr. -

has paid his debt to society. Petitioner timely filed his Article 78 Petition on

February 11, 2022. Respondent filed an Answer and Record for Review on March 7, 2022.
None of Respondent's objections are persuasive.
The Board's decision "was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an
error oflaw or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion." N.Y. CPLR § 7803(3).
Respondent's Answer is in sum and substance a re-filing of the Board's Administrative Appeals
decision. Dkt. No. 28. As a result, it fails to persuasively address three critical ways in which
the Board's decision violated § 7803(3).

First, the Board erred when it issued its decision in reliance upon an inaccurate
COMPAS assessment. Contrary to what Respondent suggests, this issue was properly preserved
in Mr. -

administrative appeal. Courts have discretionary power to reach issues properly

raised on administrative appeal. See Matter of Rodriguez v. Coughlin, 219 A.D.2d 876 ( 4th
Dep't 1995); Mixon v. Wickett, 196 A.D.3d 1094, 1096, 147 N.Y.S.3d 907,908 (2021); Nelson v.

Coughlin, 188 A.D.2d 1071, 591 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (1992). In addition, the two cases
Respondent cites do not stand for the proposition that issues not raised in a parole hearing are
waived.

-113463924

5 of 1 3

FUSL000144

Second, the Board erred when it issued its decision on the basis of a record that was

incomplete and, beyond just the COMPAS assessment, otherwise erroneous. The record
demonstrates that the Board did not review letters from the police, district attorney, and
sentencing court. Respondent argues that these letters were requested, but conveniently ignores
that the last request was in 1994 - 28 years ago. Dkt. No. 33. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Board attempted to solicit this crucial information at any point in the intervening
decades, over which time the policy of the Manhattan District Attorney has changed to both ( 1)
presumptively favor release of parolees and (2) to cease charging individuals under 25 in adult
criminal court in recognition of new research on brain development and to prevent recidivism.

Third, to the extent that the Board considered Mr. -

re-entry plan, it failed to

meaningfully do so, as it relied on a plan provided by the state that contained an incorrect release
address- an error that the Board impermissibly weighed against M r . - Dkt. No. 6 at 15.
Mr. -

testified that his counselor "[noted his release address] wrong ... the other [address]

isn't put there," and that his "counselor said to fix it. .. when I aITived [at the hearing]." Id. at 78. By the time DOCCS acknowledged and corrected the error, the record was closed. Dkt. No.
10 at 4 ("Per our conversation the address noted on your Parole Board Repo1i can be updated if
you are granted a De Novo appearance.")
For these reasons, the Comi should annul Respondent's parole denial and direct
Respondent to immediately afford Petitioner a new, de novo parole release hearing.
ARGUMENT

None of Respondent's objections are persuasive, and all are insufficient to defeat
Petitioner's Aliicle 78 Petition.

-213463924
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I.

THE BOARD'S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
Respondent contends that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious or an

abuse of discretion. In this objection, Respondent attempts to rebut each of the arguments made
in Mr. -

Petition, but none of these attempts is convincing. Most importantly, the record

demonstrates that the Board erred by relying on an incorrect COMPAS assessment, failed to
effectively solicit recommendations from Petitioner's trial counsel or the current district attorney,
and relied on incorrect reentry plans.

A.

The Board Improperly Relied on an Inaccurate COMPAS Assessment to Justify its
Denial Decision

Respondent's argument that Petitioner waived this Comt's consideration of the issue of
his inaccurate COMPAS report by failing to raise the issue at his parole hearing is legally and
factually wrong.
First, the caselaw establishes that this Court may reach issues that were raised and
addressed on administrative appeal. Matter of Rodriguez v. Coughlin, 219 A.D.2d 876 (4th
Dep't 1995) (Court may reach issues exhausted on administrative appeal); see Mixon v. Wickett,
196 A.D.3d 1094, 1096, 147 N.Y.S.3d 907,908 (2021) (same); Nelson v. Coughlin, 188 A.D.2d

Mr.-

1071, 591 N.Y.S.2d 670,671 (1992) (same). Here, the incorrect COMPAS issue was raised, and
administrative remedies were properly exhausted, in

administrative appeal. See Dkt.

No. 27 at 18-21 (exhausting administrative remedies by raising incorrect COMPAS issue at
administrative appeal). Respondent's argument that Petitioner waived review of an incoITect
COMPAS issue improperly relies on two inapposite cases: Morrison v. Evans and Vanier v.

Travis.

In Morrison v. Evans, the petitioner argued that the Board's decision was based on an
improper understanding that he was convicted of forgery in the first, and not second, degree. 81
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A.D.3d 1073, 1073- 74 (2011). Petitioner erroneously confirmed that he had been convicted of
forgery in the first degree at his hearing. Id. Nonetheless, the comt's decision did not find
waiver. Id. It simply noted that petitioner "made no effo1t to coITect [the] mism1derstanding" at
his hearing. Id.
In Vanier v. Travis, the court found that petitioner "failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced" when he raised an objection, after his parole hearing, to the use of a two-way
television to conduct his hearing. 274 A.D.2d 797, 797-98, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2000). Petitioner
argued that by using the camera, the Board violated the statutory requirement to be "personally
interviewed." Id. In describing the circumstances of the hearing, the court noted that "no
objection was expressed at the parole hearing." Id. In a separate sentence, the court noted that
petitioner had not "properly preserved the issue of teleconferencing for om review." Id.
Petitioner in Vanier did not object to the procedure used to conduct his hearing while it was
occurring, when he clearly had the opportunity to raise it.
Here, however, Mr. Vanier, Mr. -

faces a completely different scenario. Unlike petitioner in

claim is not a procedural issue later shoehorned into a substantive claim to

secm e an appeal. Instead, the Board was statutorily required to consider Mr. report. Mr. -

COMPAS

had no way to know that the Board had an incorrect report at his hearing.

The COMPAS repo1t it relied on and "weigh[ed] heavily" was, however, incorrect. Dkt. No. 6 at
15. DOCCS recognized and corrected the erroneous report on March 9, 2021 , one month after
Mr. -

parole board hearing. Dkt. No. 10, Corrected COMPAS at 4. Mr. -

was not in

a position to object during his parole hearing, and certainly not in a position to knowingly and
voluntarily waive the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 66 F.3d 431,436 (2d Cir. 1995).

-413463924
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The COMPAS report before the Board erroneously showed Petitioner's Prison
Misconduct score to be "High- 8." Dkt. No. 9, Erroneous COMPAS. This was a factual error
committed by the DOCCS upon which the Board relied. In its decision the Board expressed
pruticular concern that Mr. -

institutional accomplishments were outweighed by the

erroneous "high risk score for prison misconduct." Id. However, the corrected COMPAS score
shows M r . - Prison Misconduct score is actually a "Low - I ." Dkt. No. 10, Corrected
COMPAS. This is a material change that a new panel deserves to hear de novo and evaluate
immediately, not in 24 months.
Even if the Comt were to consider Respondent's unsuppo1ted waiver ru·gument, which it
should not, Aiticle 78's exhaustion and finality requirements exist to preclude the relitigation in
state court of claims that have already been decided at the administrative level to preserve
judicial resources and discourage gamesmanship. See, e.g., Watergate II Apartments v. Buffalo
Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 385 N.E.2d 560,563 (1978); see also United States v. Stevens,

66 F.3d 431,436 (2d Cir. 1995) (for the proposition that waiver must be knowing and voluntary).
Here, however, Petitioner, proceeding in his parole hearing without counsel, could not have
challenged the COMPAS report provided by the state because he stated on the record that he was
not even familiar with the COMPAS report. Even if the preservation standard required him to
raise the issue at his parole hearing, which it does not, see, e.g., 2 19 A.D.2d at 876, when asked
by Commissioner Cmse whether he was "familiru· with the COMPAS," Mr. -

responded,

"I'm not really familiar with that." Dkt. No. 25 at 10. Thus, unlike in Morrison, where the
petitioner presumably should have known and been familiar with his underlying conviction, Mr.
-

never confirmed the erroneous facts of his COMPAS report at his hearing. Furthermore,

Petitioner should not be faulted for relying on the state to produce an accurate prison record.
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The Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by heavily relying on the state's production
of an erroneous COMPAS repo1i for their dete1mination. The Board's decision should be
vacated and remanded for a de novo review with the corrected COMPAS report.
B.

Respondent Has Not Shown that it Properly Solicited Recommendations from the
Sentencing Judge, Defense Counsel and the District Attorney

Respondent states that " [t]he Board did send letters to the sentencing Judge, DA and
criminal defense lawyer. No response was received from any of them." Answer<][ 19.
Respondent fails to note that these letters were sent in 1994, 28 years before Mr. -

eligible for parole. At the time of conviction Mr. -

was

was 23 years old. In the intervening

decades, the Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens Disti-ict Attorney's Offices have all established
"Post-Conviction Justice Units" that include parole and reentry assistance. The Manhattan DA 's
Office that prosecuted Mr. -

currently has a policy in place to "paiiicipate substantively in

the pai·ole process with a presumption in favor of release" and to cease prosecutions of youth
under 25 in the adult criminal comi system because "[r]esearch shows that brain development
continues until up to age 25, youth are physiologically subject to more impulsive behavior, and
are still capable of growth and matmation." See Exhibit 1, Manhattan District Attorney, Day
One Letter at 2-3, available at https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/0l/DayOne-Letter-Policies-l.03.2022.pdf. Also instructive is the model used by the Brooklyn DA,
whose policy states:
For cases in which juveniles (defined as age 23 or younger at the time of the offense)
were sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence, special considerations must go into
their parole determinations so that there can be a meaningful inquiry into whether they
have matured into appropriate candidates for release.

See Exhibit 2, The Brooklyn District Attorney's Office Post Conviction Justice Bmeau, available
at http://www.brooklynda.org/post-conviction-justice-bureau/ .
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By failing to request the recommendations of the judge, DA and defense attorney for
almost three decades, over which time policies and attitudes towards juvenile offenders who
committed crimes at age 25 and under have markedly changed. Respondent has failed to show
that the Board gave "due consideration to ... recommendations of ... the disti-ict attorney [and]
the attorney for the inmate," as it must do, N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(viii).
C.

The Record Shows That the Board Did Not M eaningfully Consider P etitioner's
Reentry Plans

The Board is not absolved of its duty to explain how it analyzed the relevant factors in a
written decision "in detail and not in conclusory terms." N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a)(i); see

Mitchell v. New York State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 (2d Dep 't 2009). Among those
factors is "releas e plans including community resources, employment, education and training and
support services available to the inmate." N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iii). As explained in
Petitioner's initial brief, the record shows that the Board failed to meaningfully consider
Petitioner's release plans, due in part to the fact that it reviewed an erroneous plan. (See MOL at
6-7.) Despite acknowledging the erroneous release plan, Respondent's only response is that "the
Board did not deny release due to this." Answer ,r 10. However, the record demonstrates that the

Mr.-

Board did improperly consider and weighed this error against Mr. -

The Board noted that

"provided a proposed residence other than that noted in the record." Dkt. No. 6 at

15.

M
r.-

The Board's conclusory analysis falls short of the Board's duty to meaningfully consider
Petitioner's release plans, particularly where, as here, the Board failed to consider

testimony that his counselor "did this wrong ... the other [address] isn 't put there," and that his
"counselor said to fix it. .. when I aITived [at the hearing]." Id. at 7-8. Petitioner must be given a

de novo hearing so that the Board can properly consider his release plans.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an
order:
Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an order:
1. Annulling the decision of Respondent, dated February 9, 2021, denying Petitioner

-

parole release; and

2. Directing Respondent to immediately afford Petitioner a new, de novo parole
release hearing before a new panel that does not include any commissioner who
has previously denied Mr. -

release, at which Respondent shall consider all

appropriate statutory factors governing parole release determinations; and
3. Granting such additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 10, 2022
New York, New York
By:
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